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“We then sailed on up the narrow strait with wailing. For on one side 
lay Scylla and on the other divine Charybdis terribly sucked down the 




 In 2008, the United States Supreme Court reset the landscape of 
the Second Amendment when it issued its landmark decision in 
District of Columbia v. Heller.2 The Court held for the first time that 
the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms” was an 
individual right unconnected with any militia service.3 Two years after 
this watershed decision, the Court took the inevitable next step in 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., History, DePaul University, 2012. 
1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY BOOK XII. (Translated by A.T. Murray; Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, 1919).  
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554. U.S. 570 (2008). 
3 Id. at 595.  
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McDonald v. City of Chicago and held that the individual right 
recognized in Heller was fully applicable to state and local 
governments via incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.4  
Justice John Paul Stevens warned in his dissent in McDonald that 
the Court’s decision would lead to “an avalanche of litigation that 
would mire federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which 
state and local regulations comport with the Heller right—the precise 
contours of which are far from pellucid.”5 Indeed, Heller did not fully 
define the scope of this newly recognized Second Amendment right, 
nor did it include a standard of review for how the lower courts were 
to enforce it.6 Now, because of McDonald, these same lower courts 
faced the daunting prospect of reviewing a seemingly endless array of 
state and local gun control legislation with little guidance from the 
Supreme Court on the proper Second Amendment analytical 
framework.7 
In the void left by the Supreme Court, a majority of the Federal 
Circuit Courts of Appeals eventually settled on a two-step means-end 
framework similar in many ways to the framework used for challenges 
under the First Amendment.8 However, state and local officials and 
gun control advocates still faced an uncertain path forward. Advocates 
and legislators had to determine what regulations remained viable and 
worth pursuing to combat gun violence in the new constitutional 
regime of the Second Amendment.9 Some gun-control advocates 
remained hopeful that the Heller and McDonald decisions would have 
                                                 
4 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, [] (2010). 
5 Id. at 904 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
6 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Because [the Court’s 
decision] says little about the standards used to evaluate regulatory decisions, it will 
leave the Nation without clear standards for resolving those challenges.”). 
7  See generally, Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What's A 
Court to Do Post-McDonald? 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 492 (2012). 
8 See infra at Section IB.  
9 See, e.g., Ian W. Henderson, Rights, Regulations, and Revolvers: Baltimore 
City's Complex Constitutional Challenge Following District of Columbia v. Heller., 
39 U. BALT. L. REV. 423, 454 (2010) (“The most pertinent question presented by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Heller relates to what degree cities like Baltimore will 
have to scale back gun regulations.”). 
2
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a limited affect on other gun control measures across the country.10 
Although the Supreme Court had declared total bans on handgun 
ownership unconstitutional, advocates maintained that there was still a 
“broad range of gun regulation that remain[ed] presumptively legal.”11 
While it is true that in the years following Heller and McDonald a 
range of federal, state, and local gun regulations were upheld by courts 
across the United States,12 the same is not necessarily true for the 
jurisdiction where McDonald originated: the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The Seventh Circuit, with some exceptions, has steadily 
expanded the scope of the Second Amendment right first recognized in 
Heller, and it has repeatedly struck down state and local gun control 
measures as unconstitutional.13  
 The most recent example of this trend is the case of Ezell v 
City of Chicago (Ezell II), decided in January of 2017.14 Ezell II was 
the second round of litigation aimed at multiple Chicago gun control 
ordinances which the city had put in place after its total handgun ban 
had been invalidated by the Supreme Court in McDonald.15 Ezell II 
specifically involved various city ordinances setting zoning and 
                                                 
10 See Robert Barnes and Dan Eagen, Supreme Court Affirms Fundamental 
Right to Bear Arms, WASHINGTON POST (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/ 
AR2010062802134.html ("Over the long run, this apparent victory for gun rights 
may be more symbol than substance. It's actually a very narrow holding."). 
11 See Scott Neuman, Supreme Court Strikes Down Chicago Hand Gun Ban, 
NPR.ORG (June 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2010/06/28/128163284/supreme-court-strikes-down-chicago-handgun-ban 
(quoting Dennis Henigan, Vice President at the Brady Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence). 
12 See generally, Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations 
After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1151 (2011) (arguing that the 
response to Heller and McDonald was muted and that “[l]ower courts have been 
reluctant to read Heller and McDonald as inviting open season on gun regulations”). 
13 See discussion and cases cited infra at Section II. 
14 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter “Ezell 
II”). 
15 Id. at 889-90. 
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distancing restrictions on the construction of live firing ranges, as well 
as a restriction on minors’ access to such ranges.16 
A divided three judge Seventh Circuit panel struck down the 
ordinances as unconstitutional.17 Circuit Judge Diane Sykes wrote the 
majority opinion, in which she applied a “sliding scale” form of the 
two-step means-end test used by other circuits for Second Amendment 
claims and subjected the regulations to a heightened level of review 
akin to strict scrutiny.18 Judge Illana Rovner wrote a concurrence, 
dissenting in part, where she argued that some of the restrictions 
should have withstood constitutional scrutiny.19 Judge Rovner also had 
notably disagreed with the same majority and their use of the two-step 
means-end test in the previous iteration of the case Ezell I.20 
This article examines Ezell II in the context of the current state of 
Second Amendment jurisprudence in the Seventh Circuit and the 
Federal Courts at large, an area of constitutional law which is still in 
its relative infancy. This article argues that the sliding scale means-end 
test the majority articulated and used in Ezell I & II was not properly 
applied to Chicago’s firing range ordinances. Furthermore, this article 
argues that the level of heightened scrutiny the court used in Ezell I 
and applied again in Ezell II, which appeared to be strict scrutiny, was 
inappropriate and out of sync with the level of scrutiny that has been 
applied in the majority of other circuits in comparable cases. 
Part I of this article examines the background of Heller and 
McDonald, and the two-step means-end framework developed by the 
Circuit Courts to apply the decisions to a range of federal and local 
gun control regulations. Part II looks at the Seventh Circuit’s Second 
Amendment jurisprudence prior to Ezell II, and the background of the 
                                                 
16 Id. at 890. 
17 Id.  
18 See generally, id. at 892-93. As will be discussed further infra, Judge Sykes 
used different labels in Ezell I and Ezell II for the level of scrutiny being applied, but 
Judge Rovner noted in her opinion in Ezell I that it appeared to be strict scrutiny.  
19 See id. at 898-900 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
20 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (Rovner, J., 
concurring) (hereinafter “Ezell I”). 
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case, including the important decision in Ezell I. Part III examines the 
decision and the different opinions in Ezell II and argues that the 
majority incorrectly applied the two-step means-end scrutiny test, both 
in terms of the heightened level of scrutiny selected by Judge Sykes 
and how it was applied to the regulations at issue.   
2016 marked a record year for gun violence in Chicago, and 2017 
has shown little signs of improvement.21 In Ezell II, Judge Rover 
expressed her “sympathy for the City's difficult path between this 
Scylla and Charybdis,” as they attempt to combat gun violence while 
navigating the Constitutional reality imposed by Heller and 
McDonald.22 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in Ezell II further 
narrowed the path forward for Chicago city officials to craft 
meaningful gun control ordinances that can survive constitutional 
scrutiny. 
 
I. BACKGROUND: HELLER & MCDONALD, AND THE NEW SECOND 
AMENDMENT LANDSCAPE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
 
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Heller, it marked 
the first time in nearly 70 years that the highest court in the United 
States had tackled the Second Amendment.23 The prior case, Miller v. 
United States in 1939, did not contain much elaboration on the scope 
of the Second Amendment.24 Miller involved a challenge to a state ban 
on sawed-off shotguns which the Court upheld as constitutional under 
the Second Amendment.25 The Court concluded that there was a lack 
of evidence showing “some reasonable relationship” between the use 
of a sawed-off shot gun and “the preservation or efficiency of a well 
                                                 
21 Azadeh Ansari and Rosa Flores, Chicago’s 762 homicides in 2016 is highest 
in 19 years, CNN.COM (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/01/us/chicago-
murders-2016/index.html. 
22 Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 898. 
23 See Miller v United States, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
24 See Henderson, supra note 9, at 432.  
25 Id., citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 174. 
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regulated militia,” and remanded the case for further proceedings, 
which did not occur.26  
Although the opaque language of the Miller opinion led to 
decades of debate among courts and commentators as to the scope of 
the Court’s Second Amendment holding,27 the language in the opinion 
did appear to strongly suggest the Court’s view that the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms was only connected to militia service.28 
Regardless of the merits of this view, the interpretation that the right to 
keep and bear arms is tied to militia service was foreclosed when the 
Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in Heller. 
 
A. D.C v. Heller & McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Supreme 
Court Resets the Stage on the Second Amendment 
 
The District of Columbia’s total ban on hand gun ownership was 
the strictest gun control regulation in the country, and a ripe target for 
gun rights advocates.29 A leading libertarian think-tank spent years 
strategically assembling the perfect “law-abiding” plaintiffs to 
challenge the law and finally achieve judicial recognition of an 
individual right to keep and bear arms.30 The group found its ideal 
                                                 
26 Id. No further proceedings occurred because the original defendant Miller 
had died, and the remaining defendant struck a plea deal after the Supreme Court’s 
decision. See Id.  
27 See David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second 
Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 208-09 (2017). 
28 See Henderson, supra note 9, at 432. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent 
in Heller, virtually every Court of Appeals to interpret Miller understood it to hold 
that “the Second Amendment does not protect the right to possess and use guns for 
purely private, civilian purposes. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 n.2 (2008) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (listing cases).  
29 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Ruling 5-4, Endorse Personal Right to Own 
Gun, NY TIMES (June 27, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotus.html?mcubz=0 
30 Adam Liptak Carefully Plotted Course Propels Gun Case to Top, NY TIMES 
(Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/us/03bar.html 
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plaintiff in Dick Heller, a security guard who carried a gun on duty but 
was denied a license by the District to keep his firearm in his home.31   
In a bitterly split opinion, the Court in Heller ruled that the 
District’s ban was unconstitutional.32 The Court held that the Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to “possess a firearm 
unconnected with service in a militia,” as well as the right to use that 
arm for “traditionally lawful purposes such as self defense in the 
home.”33 In a sprawling opinion for the majority, Justice Scalia relied 
on what some scholars have called “new originalsm” principles by 
looking at the “text, history and tradition” of the Second Amendment 
to conclude that it conferred an individual right.34 Additionally, Justice 
Scalia argued that the text and history indicated that the central core of 
an individual’s Second Amendment right was the “inherent right of 
self-defense.”35 By casting the Second Amendment in this way—as 
protecting an individual right to keep a firearm in the home for self-
defense—the Court found that the District’s ban was necessarily 
unconstitutional.36 
Justice Stevens wrote a highly critical dissent in which he called 
the majority opinion a “strained and unpersuasive reading” of the 
Second Amendment’s text and history.37 Justice Stevens presented his 
own historical and textual analysis to argue that the right to keep and 
bare arms under the Second Amendment was solely connected to 
                                                 
31 Greenhouse, supra note 29; D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574 (2008). 
32 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.  
33 Id. 
34 See Nicholas Griepsma, Concealed Carry Through Common Use: Extending 
Heller's Constitutional Construction, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 284, 286 (2017). For a 
more thorough discussion of originalsm in the context of Heller, see generally 
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 924 (2009). For a counter view to the generally accepted wisdom that 
Heller represents a paradigmatic “Originalist” opinion, see Robert Leider, Our Non-
Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 89 IND. L.J. 1587, 1650 (2014) (arguing Heller 
represented “popular constitutionalism” and remade the Second Amendment around 
its current popular understanding).  
35 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.  
36 See id. at 630.  
37 Heller, 554 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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militia service, and that neither the text nor the history presented by 
the majority “evidenced the slightest interest” on the part of the 
Founders “in limiting any legislature's authority to regulate private 
civilian uses of firearms.”38  
Justice Breyer also wrote a dissent arguing for an “interest-
balancing inquiry” whereby the interests protected by the Second 
Amendment would be weighted against the public safety interests of 
the government to determine “whether the regulation at issue 
impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the 
latter.”39 The majority opinion expressly rejected Justice Breyer’s 
proposed framework, which is ironic given the interest balancing that 
is an inherent part of the two-step means-end test that would emerge in 
the lower courts.40 
Apart from its principle holding recognizing the individual right 
to keep and bear arms in the home for the purposes of self defense, the 
Court in Heller declined to “clarify the entire field” of the Second 
Amendment.41 The Court did note, however, that the right was not 
“unlimited”42 and indicated that many areas of gun regulation 
remained “presumptively lawful.”43 The Court cautioned that: 
 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on 
the commercial sale of arms.44 
 
                                                 
38 Id. at 637. 
39 Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
40 See generally, Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle 
over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 711 (2012). 
41 Heller, 554 U.S at 635. 
42 Id. at 595. 
43 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 214. 
44 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
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Additionally, in an attempt to square its holding with the cryptic ruling 
in Miller,45  the Court stated that the Second Amendment “does not 
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens 
for lawful purposes.”46 Furthermore, the Second Amendment did not 
protect “dangerous and unusual” weapons.47 Apart from sawed-off 
shot guns and “machineguns,” however, the court did not explicitly 
point to other types of “unusual” weapons not typically used for 
“lawful purposes.”48 
Notably absent from the Heller majority’s discussion of Second 
Amendment principles49 was any concrete standard of review.50 The 
Court only stated that the District’s ban would fail under “any of the 
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional right,”51 though the Court later conceded in a footnote 
that the law would likely pass rational-basis review “like almost all 
laws” would.52 The only standard the Court seemed to foreclose was 
rational basis, stating that the test was not appropriate for evaluating 
legislative regulation of a “specific, enumerated right” under the Bill 
of Rights.53 Justice Breyer was critical of the majority leaving the 
lower courts “without clear standards” for resolving future Second 
Amendment disputes, and he warned that without clear standards the 
                                                 
45 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 214. 
46 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
47 Id. at 627.  
48 Id.at 624-25 (“We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second 
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”). The Court did 
indicate that current bans on “machineguns” remained valid, and suggested that 
military style assault rifles like the M-16 were not protected arms. See id. For more 
on how the lower courts have approached this question of what arms constitute 
unprotected “dangerous and unusual” weapons, see Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 
27, at 230-241.  
49 For more analysis of the opinions in Heller, see generally, Rostron, supra 
note 40; Griepsma, supra note 34.  
50 Griepsma, supra note 34.  
51 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.  
52 Id. at 628, n. 27.   
53 Id.  
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imminent wave of Second Amendment litigation “threaten[ed] to leave 
cities without effective protection against gun violence.”54 
The Court did not clarify the standard of review question when it 
revisited the Second Amendment two years later in McDonald v City 
of Chicago.55 The Court in McDonald embarked on a historical 
inquiry to determine if the right to individual self-defense, which was 
recognized in Heller as a “central component of the Second 
Amendment,” was also so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition” as to be part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.56 A majority of Justices answered in the affirmative, 
holding that the individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense 
was one of the “fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered 
liberty.”57 Therefore, the Second Amendment was incorporated and 
applied against state and local government through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.58  
The plurality opinion by Justice Samuel Alito restated many of the 
same principles from Heller, including the recognition of 
presumptively valid regulations such as longstanding prohibitions of 
firearm possession by felons or the carrying of guns in “sensitive 
places.”59 However, the Court again did not fully elaborate the 
contours of the Second Amendment’s protections. Instead, after 
invalidating Chicago’s ban on handguns, Justice Alito signaled to 
                                                 
54 Id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
55 As previously mentioned, McDonald involved a challenge to hand gun ban’s 
in Chicago (and neighboring suburb of Oak Park, IL). See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 748 (2010).  
56 See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller 
and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1141 (2011) (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
777.) 
57 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 777. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 786. (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt 
on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.’ We repeat those 
assurances here.”). 
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states and local governments to continue to experiment with 
“reasonable firearms regulation.”60  
The Court, however, offered no additional guidance on what 
experiments in gun regulations might be “reasonable” and gave no 
standard to lower courts as to how they were to review the 
constitutionality of these state and local experiments in gun control.61 
Though the McDonald Court reaffirmed its rejection of any sort of a 
judicial balancing inquiry, like that proposed by Justice Breyer in 
Heller,62 the Court declined to address what standards of review or 
levels of scrutiny should guide lower courts going forward.63  
Justice Breyers’s dissent in Heller and Justice Stevens’s dissent in 
McDonald both warned of the inevitable flood of litigation in the 
lower courts, and the dangers of leaving no clear standards to guide 
the decisions. Over time though, a majority of the Federal Circuit 
Courts of Appeals would eventually develop and adopt their own 
framework for analyzing the new wave of Second Amendment 
challenges they encountered. 
 
B. The Federal Courts React to the New Second Amendment 
Regime: The Development of the Two-Step Means-End Test 
 
Not surprisingly, in the initial few years following Heller and then 
McDonald, there were hundreds of challenges to firearm regulations in 
the lower courts.64 As the Supreme Court had avoided describing the 
full scope of the Second Amendment’s protections, some of the initial 
lower court cases were concerned with the question of what other 
“lawful” uses of firearms were protected by the Second Amendment 
                                                 
60 See Id. at 785.  
61 Kiehl, supra note 56, at 1140-41. 
62 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785. 
63 See Kiehl, supra note 56, at 1140-41. 
64 Id. at 1141. 
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besides the right to keep arms in the home for self-defense.65 The 
problem that arose early on in all these cases was what standard courts 
should use to review regulations on firearm use when they allegedly 
burdened conduct determined to be within the scope of the Second 
Amendment.66  
 In the initial years following the Supreme Court decisions, lower 
courts used virtually the complete range of standards to evaluate gun 
control measures, including varying levels of intermediate or strict 
scrutiny (or a hybrid of both), a reasonableness test, and an undue 
burden test similar to that applied in abortion cases.67 Some courts 
avoided setting any standard all together.68 Regardless of the test used, 
the gun control measures usually survived review.69 
Eventually, a guiding framework for analysis emerged in the form 
of a two-part means-end test similar to that used in the First 
Amendment context.70 The test was first explicitly articulated by the 
Third Circuit in United States v Marzzarella.71 The first step of this 
analysis is to determine whether the regulation at issue burdens 
conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment 
protections.72 If the conduct does not fall within the scope of the 
Second Amendment or there is no burden, then the inquiry is complete 
and the regulation withstands constitutional review.73 If there is a 
burden on protected conduct, the second step is to evaluate the 
                                                 
65 See e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that the Second Amendment protects other lawful uses of 
firearms like hunting); see generally, Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27. 
66 Kiehl, supra note 56, at 1141.  
67 See id. at 1145-49 (describing cases). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1141. (“[T]he only consistency in the lower court cases is in the 
results. Regardless of the test used, challenged gun laws almost always survive.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
70 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 212-14.  




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/3




regulation under some level of means-end scrutiny.74 The burden of 
proof is on the government throughout both steps.75 
As to the first step, Heller described only one clear area of 
conduct that is at the core of the Second Amendment’s protection: the 
right of law-abiding individuals to keep a firearm in the home for self-
defense.76 For other forms of conduct that do not clearly fit in the 
realm of home self-defense, the inquiry on whether the conduct is 
covered by the Second Amendment is primarily a historical and textual 
analysis modeled after the Heller decision itself.77 The courts rely on a  
“wide array of interpretative materials to conduct a historical analysis” 
in order to determine if the “historical traditions” surrounding the 
conduct at issue indicate it was considered protected activity.78 In 
practice, this step involves combing through a “variety of legal and 
other sources to determine the public understanding of [the] legal text 
in the period after its enactment or ratification.”79  
Drawing analogies to historical gun control measures is rife with 
limitations, given the fundamental differences between the interests 
involved with the use of firearms in the founding area compared to 
gun violence concerns today.80 This conflict between current and 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 214.  
76 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 88; see also Kopel & Greenlean, supra note 27, at 
211 (“Heller leaves no doubt that self-defense is at the core of the right” under the 
Second Amendment.). 
77 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 229. 
78 See NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012). 
79 Id. at 194 n.8. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 605). Examples of these sources 
include similar arms-baring protections in state constitutions or legislation; 
commentaries by scholars and legislatures around the time of ratification; and 19th 
century legislation limiting or burdening the same or analogous conduct as the 
present law under review. See Id.  
80 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 714-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the “self 
defense” interests of the founding era were not comparable to the urban-crime 
prevention interest of the present day, given that, to the founding era Americans 
living on the frontier, self defense meant protection from “outbreaks of fighting with 
Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays' Rebellion, marauders, and crime-related 
dangers to travelers on the roads, on footpaths, or along waterways.”). 
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historical interests reflects the larger deficiency with using “original 
public meaning” analysis to determine the current scope of a 
constitutional right.81 Placing these issues aside for now, for this 
article’s purposes it is enough to say that under the two-step test 
adopted by the lower courts, the first step requires that judges examine 
all the historical evidence that the parties and the jurists themselves 
can muster. The ultimate goal is to determine if the present restriction 
on gun use or ownership under review “is consistent with a 
longstanding tradition” of founding era and 19th century legislatures 
restricting gun use or ownership in a comparable manner.82 
In terms of the second step and the proper level of means-end 
scrutiny to apply, the Court in Heller only foreclosed the use of 
rational basis review.83 Therefore, the lower courts have almost 
uniformly agreed that some level of heightened scrutiny applies.84 The 
courts select a level of scrutiny in a manner similar to the general First 
                                                 
81 For a general critique of originalsm and original public meaning analysis in 
the context of Heller, see generally Morgan Cloud, A Conclusion in Search of a 
History to Support It, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29 (2010). 
82 See BATFE, 700 F.3d at 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding after an exhaustive 
historical review that the challenged federal statute banning licenses dealers from 
selling firearms to minors under 21 was “consistent with a longstanding tradition of 
age– and safety-based restrictions on the ability to access arms,” which meant that 
the ability of 18-20 year olds to purchase firearms “falls outside the Second 
Amendment's protection.”). The BAFTE court indicated that they were “inclined” to 
uphold the statute based on their historical analysis in step one, but they noted the 
“institutional challenges” in reaching a definitive historical conclusion, and thus they 
proceeded to analyze the statute under step two. Id. For more examples of the 
historical inquiry of step one in practice, see, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 
8, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (upholding similar statute banning minors from possessing 
firearms based on historical evidence); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 519 -
520 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding sentencing enhancements for using firearms in the 
commission of a crime based on historical analysis). 
83 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
84 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 274 n. 486 (listing cases from 
nearly every circuit agreeing that the use of rational basis is foreclosed and some 
heightened level of scrutiny applies). According to Kopel & Greenlee, the sole 
exception appears to be the Second Circuit, which requires a “substantial burden” on 
protected conduct for the Court to apply more than rational basis review. Id.   
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Amendment framework, where “the level of scrutiny applicable under 
the Second Amendment . . .‘depends on the nature of the conduct 
being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens 
the right.’”85 Therefore, a law that imposes a “substantial burden” 
upon the core rights protected by the Second Amendment, such as self-
defense in the home, needs to have a “strong justification” akin to 
strict scrutiny.86 A law that imposes a less substantial burden or that 
implicates conduct that is not a core right, like self-defense in the 
home but is more ancillary conduct such as registration requirements 
or permit fees, should be “proportionately easier to justify.”87   
The way in which any individual panels describe the level of 
scrutiny they are applying can vary widely from case to case and judge 
to judge.88 As a general principle, the highest level of scrutiny (strict 
scrutiny) is typically reserved for those laws that threaten the core 
Second Amendment rights of law abiding citizens to use a firearm in 
the home for self-defense89 or that restrict other activity that the 
historical inquiry of the first step indicates was traditionally at the core 
of the Second Amendment’s protections, such as hunting.90 For 
example, courts have applied strict scrutiny to lifetime bans on 
handgun ownership for nonviolent misdemeanants91 and a categorical 
ban on persons buying guns from outside their home state.92  
                                                 
85 Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 
680 (4th Cir. 2010). 
86 Id. 
87See id.  
88 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 196.  
89 See NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A regulation that 
threatens a right at the core of the Second Amendment—for example, the right of a 
law-abiding, responsible adult to possess and use a handgun to defend his or her 
home and family—triggers strict scrutiny.”) (citing Heller 554 U.S. at 635). 
90 See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1252. For additional cases recognizing activities 
like hunting and target practice as covered by the Second Amendment, see generally 
Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 204-07. 
91 Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
92 Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 804 (N.D. Tex. 2015); For more 
examples, see generally Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 274-78. 
15
: Between Scylla and Charybdis: <i>Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




Conversely, for regulations shy of the total bans on gun ownership 
found in Heller and McDonald that do not substantially burden the 
core rights protected under the Second Amendment, but which still 
implicate conduct within the scope of the Amendment’s protections, 
the courts tend to apply a less heightened standard more akin to 
intermediate scrutiny.93 The overwhelming majority of lower court 
decisions post-Heller involving the Second Amendment have applied 
something akin to intermediate scrutiny, whereby the regulation must 
be substantially related to an important government interest.94  
Many courts using this two-step framework draw comparisons to 
the First Amendment framework for how they decide which level of 
heightened scrutiny to apply.95 For example, total bans on gun 
ownership in the home could be seen as comparable to content-based 
restrictions on speech, and thus subject to strict scrutiny.96 Similarly, 
                                                 
93 See Kopel and Greenlee, supra note 27, at 314. 
94 See e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261–64 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to prohibition on possession of magazines 
with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition); United States v. Booker, 
644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal law 
prohibiting the possession of firearms by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538, 182 L.Ed.2d 175 (2012); United 
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a federal regulation which prohibits “carrying or possessing a loaded 
weapon in a motor vehicle” within national park areas), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 756, 
181 L.Ed.2d 482 (2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 
2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal law which prohibits the possession 
of firearms with obliterated serial numbers), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 958, 178 L.Ed.2d 
790 (2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to a federal law which prohibits the possession of firearms 
while subject to a domestic protection order), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2476, 179 
L.Ed.2d 1214 (2011); Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2015) (ban on 
magazines holding more than ten rounds is valid under intermediate scrutiny). 
95 See e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010). 
96 Cf. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 968 (9th Cir. 
2014) (San Francisco ordinances regulating firearm storage in the home were 
distinguishable from the total bans on handgun possession invalidated in Heller, and 
were “akin to a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction,” thus they only 
needed to survive intermediate scrutiny). 
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content-neutral regulations that only restrict the “time, place, and 
manner” by which the Second Amendment rights can be exercised, for 
example by regulating how firearms are stored when not in use, should 
be subjected only to intermediate scrutiny as in the speech context.97 
Furthermore, at least one court has argued that intermediate scrutiny 
makes particular sense and is preferred in the Second Amendment 
context because of the unique public safety risk of the activity being 
regulated—firearm use—which sets it apart from other fundamental 
rights which are typically evaluated under strict scrutiny.98 
Thus, the consensus that has emerged in the courts appears to be a 
for applying a form of intermediate scrutiny in the majority of cases 
involving the Second Amendment, and reserving strict scrutiny for 
those cases that substantially burden the core right of self defense in 
the home, or other conduct that historical inquiry reveals is a core right 
of the Second Amendment.99 
 The Seventh Circuit’s approach, however, has not been 
entirely in line with this majority view. Several of the Seventh 
Circuit’s early post-Heller and McDonald decisions attempted to avoid 
any discussion of a set standard of review or level of scrutiny. 
Furthermore, while the courts in Ezell I and Ezell II purported to adopt 
and apply the same two-step framework as used in a majority of 
                                                 
97 Id.  
98 Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (“The risk inherent in firearms and other weapons 
distinguishes the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that have 
been held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, such as the right to marry and 
the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination, which can be exercised without 
creating a direct risk to others. Intermediate scrutiny appropriately places the burden 
on the government to justify its restrictions, while also giving governments 
considerable flexibility to regulate gun safety.”). 
99 See Griepsma, supra note 34, at 296 (arguing intermediate scrutiny appears 
to be the most common level of scrutiny used in Second Amendment cases). See 
generally Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27 (collecting cases, the majority of which 
apply something akin to intermediate scrutiny).  
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circuits,100 in both those cases the test was improperly applied to strike 
down gun control measures.  
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
 
The en banc Seventh Circuit has only granted review of a Second 
Amendment challenge on one occasion, and it was in the relatively 
immediate aftermath of Heller and McDonald in 2010.101  The en banc 
court, in an opinion authored by then Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
held a federal statute that banned firearm possession by individuals 
convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence was 
permissible under the Second Amendment.102 The court noted the 
language from Heller on presumptively valid regulations—like bans 
on felons possessing guns—as evidence that some categorical bans on 
firearm ownership could be constitutional.103 But, Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinion strongly cautioned the lower courts against reading too much 
into the language of Heller beyond its principle holding conferring an 
individual right, one part of which was to keep a firearm in the home 
for self defense.104 While the Skoien court declined to delve too 
“deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire,” it did agree that some 
form of “strong showing” was necessary and indicated that the law 
would pass intermediate scrutiny review.105  
                                                 
100 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We note for 
good measure that most other circuits have adopted the framework articulated 
in Ezell I”). 
101 See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
102 See id. at 640-42. 
103 Id. at 640. 
104 Id. (“We do not think it profitable to parse these passages of Heller as if 
they contained an answer to the question whether § 922(g)(9) is valid. They are 
precautionary language. . . . What other entitlements the Second Amendment creates, 
and what regulations legislatures may establish, were left open. The opinion is not a 
comprehensive code; it is just an explanation for the Court's disposition. Judicial 
opinions must not be confused with statutes, and general expressions must be read in 
light of the subject under consideration.”) 
105 Id. at 642 (The government conceded the regulation was only valid 
“if substantially related to an important governmental objective” and the court stated 
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 Though it is not the explicit framework in the opinion, the 
analysis in Skoien can be viewed as roughly in line with the two-step 
means-end test.106 The court recognized that misdemeanants with 
domestic violence convictions were not totally excluded from Second 
Amendment protection (step one) and indicated the statute would pass 
intermediate scrutiny (step two).107 Not long after Skoien, the three-
judge panel in Ezell I (2011) formally adopted the same two-step 
framework now used by the majority of other circuits. Ezell I is 
discussed in more detail below as important background for Ezell II. 
 
A. Too Clever by Half: Ezell I and Chicago’s First Attempt at 
Post-McDonald Gun Regulation 
 
Ezell I is worth examining in some detail as it is not only the first 
round of litigation for the case that is the primary subject of this 
article, but it also is critically important to the Seventh Circuit’s 
Second Amendment jurisprudence in how the majority adopted and 
described the two-step test. Furthermore, the manner in which the 
majority in Ezell I inappropriately applied the two-step framework 
was significant in constraining the constitutional path forward for gun 
control advocates seeking to curtail gun violence in Chicago.  
 After the Supreme Court declared Chicago’s ban on handgun 
ownership unconstitutional in McDonald, the City Council organized 
hearings to determine what steps they could take to continue to combat 
gun violence in the city.108 Just four days after the decision in 
McDonald, and after testimony from a range of academics, experts, 
                                                                                                                   
that “no one doubts that the goal of § 922(g)(9), preventing armed mayhem, is an 
important governmental objective. Both logic and data establish a substantial relation 
between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.”). 
106 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 242. The Seventh Circuit had also 
applied what appeared to be a form of the two-step test in the panel decision in 
United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), which was later vacated when 
the case was reheard en banc, and again in United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 
691 (7th Cir. 2010), which followed the logic of the en banc Skoien decision to 
uphold the federal ban on convicted felons possessing firearms. Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011).  
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and community activists, the City Council passed the Responsible Gun 
Owners Ordinance (the “Ordinance”).109 The Ordinance contained a 
sweeping array of gun control measures and restrictions including: 
bans on certain types of weapons, ammunition and accessories; 
forbidding the sale or transfer of weapons except in limited 
circumstances; and a complex permitting regime.110 Inevitably, the 
Ordinance was challenged in a flood of new litigation by gun owners, 
retailers, and rights activists.111  
 Ezell I specifically involved provisions of the Ordinance that 
banned all live firing-ranges within the city limits.112 The range ban on 
its own would perhaps already be suspect, but another part of the 
Ordinance conditioned firearm permits on the completion of a state 
certified firearm safety course with a mandated requirement of one-
hour of range-training.113 Thus, as a practical matter, no individual 
could satisfy their Chicago permit requirements within the city 
limits.114 
 A group of gun owners, activists, and a prospective firing 
range operator brought suit against the city seeking a restraining order 
and injunction against enforcement of the firing-range ban.115 The 
plaintiffs argued that the Ordnance burdened their Second Amendment 
right to keep a firearm in the home for self-defense—because live 
training was required for a permit—as well as their right to maintain 
proficiency in firearm use which they claimed was also protected by 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 See Id. at 690-91. The full Ordinance is available at 
https://www.ispfsb.com/Public/Firearms/Ordinances/chicago.pdf.  
111 See e.g., Illinois Ass'n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 928, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (ordinance banning nearly all sale and transfer of 
arms); Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 747 
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (zoning requirements for gun stores and ban on displaying their 
firearms in windows, as well as a permit fee requirement).  
112 Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 690-91(CHI. MUN.CODE § 8–20–280 prohibited all 
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the Second Amendment.116 After a hearing and some limited 
testimony, the District Court denied both the plaintiffs’ motions for a 
temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction.117  
The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous judgment, reversed the 
district court and remanded with instructions for the district court to 
issue a preliminary injunction against the firing range ban.118 Judge 
Diane Sykes, who notably had dissented from the en banc decision in 
Skoien, wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Judge 
Michael Kanne.119 Judge Ilana Rovner concurred in the judgment but 
filed a separate opinion.120 Judge Sykes described the primary issue 
before the court as whether the firing range ban violated the Second 
Amendment on its face, and whether the ability to maintain 
proficiency in firearm use through live range training fell within the 
scope of the Second Amendment.121 
To answer this question, Judge Sykes utilized the framework of 
the two-step means-end test discussed supra, which at the time was 
already starting to be utilized in several other circuits.122 Judge Sykes 
described the first step of the analysis as “a textual and historical 
inquiry into original meaning” to determine if the conduct fell within 
the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was publicly 
                                                 
116 Id.  
117 See generally Ezell v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 5135, 2010 WL 3998104, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010). 
118 Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703. 
119 Id. at 689. 
120 Id. at 711. 
121 Id. at 697-98. The court also addressed the preliminary issues of standing, 
and the district court’s improper conclusion that the ability of the plaintiffs to leave 
the city limits for firearm training meant that the second Amendment was not 
implicated at all. Id. Rather, the court noted the general rule that the ability to 
exercise a constitutional right someplace else does not mean the right is not 
infringed, and because this was a facial challenge to a law and involved a burden on 
a constitutional right, irreparable harm was presumed and the inquiry needed to 
move to the likelihood of success on the merits. 
122 Id. at 703 (noting the Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuit had recently adopted 
the framework). 
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understood at the time of ratification.123 Judge Sykes described the 
second step as an inquiry into “the strength of the government’s 
justification for regulating or restricting” the exercise of that right.124 
Similar to the second step in the other circuits, this involves applying 
some heightened level of “mean-end scrutiny” to the law.125 
In this case, the majority answered the first inquiry by holding 
that the core right to possess firearms for self defense also “implies a 
corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their 
use.”126 The City attempted to point to a number of founding era, 
antebellum and Reconstruction laws that limited the discharge of 
firearms in public urban environments as evidence that the original 
public meaning of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment did not 
include a right to live firing-range training.127 The majority dismissed 
these statutes as unpersuasive, claiming that most were restrictions on 
the “time, place, and manner” that firearms could be discharged and 
were not as severe as the City’s total ban on firing ranges.128 As the 
majority concluded the City failed to meet its burden in showing that 
live firearm training was “wholly outside the Second Amendment,” the 
analysis needed to proceed to step two.129 
Similar to the court in Marzzarella, Judge Sykes next looked to 
First Amendment doctrine for guidance on the level of scrutiny to 
                                                 
123 Id. at 700. The relevant time period depends on whether the law at issue is 
federal or state/local action. See id. (“Heller suggests that some federal gun laws will 
survive Second Amendment challenge because they regulate activity falling outside 
the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was 
ratified; McDonald confirms that if the claim concerns a state or local law, the 
“scope” question asks how the right was publicly understood when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was proposed and ratified.”) 
124 Id. at 703. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 705. 
128 Id. The city did offer some evidence of historical regulations that totally 
banned the discharge of firearms in city limits, but the majority distinguished those 
regulations as focused on “fire suppression” and not relevant to Chicago’s offered 
justifications for theft prevention and injury from stray bullets. Id. 
129 Id. at 706. 
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chose, and the appropriate circumstances for applying intermediate or 
strict scrutiny.130 Setting the “labels aside,” however, Judge Sykes 
extrapolated from the First Amendment doctrine to a “sliding scale” 
test for Second Amendment claims, whereby the general principles of 
review are: 
 
First, a severe burden on the core Second Amendment right 
of armed self-defense will require an extremely strong public-
interest justification and a close fit between the government's 
means and its end. Second, laws restricting activity lying 
closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right, laws 
that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens 
on the right may be more easily justified. How much more 
easily depends on the relative severity of the burden and its 
proximity to the core of the right.131 
 
Judge Sykes’ formulation of the second step is generally similar to 
that developed in the other circuits at the time,132 but her mention of 
setting aside the labels of strict and intermediate scrutiny is significant. 
The other circuits to adopt the two-step test at the time had typically 
described the choice of what level of scrutiny at the second step of the 
analysis in more binary terms as a choice between strict and 
intermediate scrutiny.133 Judge Sykes opinion later demonstrates that 
the application of this sliding-scale scrutiny as she has described it 
allows for even more flexibility for judges to tilt the scale in how they 
characterize the nature of the right and the appropriate level of 
                                                 
130 Id. 706-708. 
131 Id. at 708. 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (“the 
level of scrutiny we apply depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and 
the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right”). 
133 See e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(choosing between strict and intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Chester, 628 
F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (same). 
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scrutiny. Furthermore, setting aside labels can obscure just exactly 
what level of review a judge is applying.134 
 In terms of the appropriate level of scrutiny for the City’s 
ordinance banning firing ranges, Judge Sykes contrasted the case with 
the factual circumstances of Skoien where the court had required a 
“strong showing” akin to intermediate scrutiny.135 In Skoien, 
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the ban on domestic 
violent misdemeanants did not impact the rights of “law-abiding, 
responsible citizens,”136 nor, according to Judge Sykes, did it implicate 
the central right of self defense.137 Here, the the firearm ban prevented 
“law-abiding citizens” from engaging in target practice, which, 
according to Judge Sykes, was a “serious encroachment on the right to 
maintain proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to the 
meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-
defense.”138 Also of note was that a firearm permit in Chicago required 
live range training.139 Taken together, this necessitated “a more 
rigorous standard than was applied in Skoien,” or what Judge Sykes 
described as “not quite ‘strict scrutiny.’”140 This standard required the 
city “establish a close fit between the range ban and the actual public 
interests it serves, and also that the public's interests are strong enough 
to justify so substantial an encumbrance on individual Second 
Amendment rights.”141 
 The court held that the city did not come close to meeting this 
burden, stating that the record contained no data or expert opinion but 
only mere speculation on the public health risks due to stray bullets 
                                                 
134 As is discussed further infra, Ezell I and Ezell II are themselves prime 
examples of this, as the majority describes the standard of review in different ways 
in each case, despite it supposedly being the same.   
135 Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 708. 
136 Id. at 708 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634). 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 708-709. 
24
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/3




and more guns susceptible to theft.142 Interestingly, Judge Sykes noted 
that the concerns of the city on the record could be “addressed through 
sensible zoning and other appropriately tailored regulations,”143 which 
is of note considering her later opinion in Ezell II discussed below. 
Because the range ban was “wholly out of proportion” to the public 
interests the city purported to serve, the court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits and ordered 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction.144 
 Judge Rover wrote a concurrence in which she agreed with 
the ultimate judgment insofar that the firing range ban was an 
unconstitutional burden on the core right of self-defense identified in 
Heller because the practical effect was that law abiding citizens would 
not be able to obtain a permit for a gun even if the sole purpose was 
self-defense in the home.145 Judge Rovner also did seem to agree that 
the right to use a firearm for self-defense in the home implied some 
protected right to train to use guns safely,146 but she pointed out that 
did not necessarily imply a right to live firearm training, as there were 
other options like classroom and simulated training.147 Regardless, 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 709.  
144 Id. In addition to the range ban itself, the court order injunctions for a range 
of other ordinances prohibiting the carrying of guns in public and the permit 
requirement, in so far as they prohibited individuals from exercising their right to 
range training. See id.  
145 See Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 711 (Rovner, J. concurring) (“The regulation is two 
clever by half…That residents may travel outside the jurisdiction to fulfill the 
training requirement is irrelevant to the validity of the ordinance inside the City. In 
this I agree with the majority . . . the City may not condition gun ownership for self-
defense in the home on a prerequisite that the City renders impossible to fulfill 
within the City limits.”). 
146 Id. at 712 (“the right to use a firearm in the home for self-defense would be 
seriously impaired if gun owners were prevented from obtaining the training 
necessary to use their weapons safely for that purpose”). 
147 Id. (“There is no ban on classroom training. There is no ban on training 
with a simulator and several realistic simulators are commercially available, 
complete with guns that mimic the recoil of firearms discharging live ammunition.”) 
(citing to examples of simulation systems).  
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Judge Rovner concluded that the limited evidence on the record 
supporting the City’s public safety justifications, and the fact that the 
Ordinance was a complete ban on the training necessary to obtain a 
permit, meant that the range ban was “unlikely to withstand scrutiny 
under any standard of review.”148 
 However, this conclusion was the end of Judge Rovner’s 
agreement with the majority, and her concurrence was highly critical 
of the manner in which Judge Sykes applied the two-step analysis, 
specifically the level of scrutiny the majority applied.149 Despite Judge 
Sykes eschewing labels, Judge Rover recognized the standard applied 
by the majority as “akin to strict scrutiny,” which she argued was 
“more stringent [a standard] than is justified by the text or the history 
of the Second Amendment.”150 Judge Rover noted that the range ban 
was not a complete ban on conduct “implicating the core of the 
Second Amendment,” but rather the ban should be characterized as a 
“a regulation in training, an area ancillary to a core right.”151 Because 
the “right to maintain proficiency in firearms handling is not the same 
as the right to practice at a live gun range,” Judge Rovner could not 
agree that a more rigorous standard than the intermediate scrutiny that 
was applied in Skoien was necessary.152  
Additionally, Judge Rovner noted that the historical evidence of 
regulations offered by the City was proof that intermediate scrutiny 
was the more appropriate standard.153 Despite the majority’s attempt to 
distinguish the ban on live training from the historical regulations, 
Judge Rovner argued that the Ordinance fell into the same category of 
many of the historical laws which regulated the “time, place and 
manner of gun discharges.”154 Just as some of the historical examples 
of regulations were focused on only the time of day or location that 
                                                 
148 Id. 
149 See id. at 713.  
150 Id. 
151 Id. (emphasis added). 
152 Id. 
153 See id.  
154 Id. 
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firearms could be discharged,155 the live firing range ban was just a 
restriction on one “aspect of firearms training,” i.e. a restriction on one 
manner of training (live as opposed to simulated) and on the place 
(within the city limits).156 Given these similarities, the “intermediate 
scrutiny applied to time, place and manner restrictions” in the First 
Amendment context would have been “both adequate and appropriate” 
in this Second Amendment case.157  
Furthermore, the manner in which the majority summarily 
dismissed the City’s offered public safety justification as “entirely 
speculative” was, in Judge Rovner’s words, “naïve” and 
“unfounded.”158 Judge Rovner argued that the historical examples of 
gun regulation offered by the city showed that  “public safety was a 
paramount value to our ancestors,”159 and that public safety concerns 
sometimes “trumped the Second Amendment right to discharge a 
firearm in a particular place.”160 Though the nature of the public safety 
concern may have changed from the founding area to now, the 
“historical context” nonetheless should have been proof for the 
majority that “cities may take public safety into account in setting 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the discharge of 
firearms within City limits.”161 Given the unique “inherently 
dangerous” nature of guns, Judge Rovner argued that Chicago “has a 
right to impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the 
operation of live ranges in the interest of public safety and other 
legitimate governmental concerns.”162 Viewing the regulations as a 
                                                 
155 Id. (“as the majority itself points out, one statute prohibited the discharge of 
firearms before sunrise, after sunset, or within one quarter mile of the nearest 
building. Others prohibited firearms discharge without specific permissions and only 
then at specific locations”). 
156 Id. at 714.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id.  
161 Id.  
162 Id. at 714-15. 
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“time, place and manner” restriction, the appropriate means of analysis 
should have been intermediate scrutiny.163  
  While Judge Rovner may have agreed that the City could not 
even meet this level of scrutiny, based on the lack of evidence on the 
record and the ban effectively making it impossible to achieve a 
permit in the city limits, 164 her concurrence in Ezell I is incredibly 
important to the future of Second Amendment analysis in the Seventh 
Circuit. Judge Rovner was operating in the same two-step framework 
as the majority, by looking at the historical evidence for the scope of 
the Second Amendment right and choosing the appropriate level of 
scrutiny based on the nature of that right and how it was being 
regulated. Doing this analysis led her to appropriately conclude 
intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review based on the nature of 
the ban as a time, place, and manner restriction.165 This approach is in 
line with how other circuits have applied the two-step analysis and 
likewise applied intermediate scrutiny for time, place, and manner 
style gun restrictions, or when the activity at issue is an ancillary right 
and not a core Second Amendment right.166 Judge Rovner’s 
concurrence in Ezell I in other words is an early post-Heller example 
of faithful application of the two-step analysis to gun regulation under 
the Second Amendment. 
Conversely, Judges Sykes majority opinion, while it was pivotal 
in laying the foundation and formally adopting the two-step Second 
Amendment analysis for the Seventh Circuit,167 is an example in how 
                                                 
163 Id. at 714.  
164 Id. at 712. 
165 Id. at 714. 
166 See e.g., cases cited supra, note 94.  
167 For examples of cases since Ezell I applying the two-Step test, see Horsley 
v. Trame, 808 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying test to parent signature 
requirement for minors under 21 to get FOIA card); Justice v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 
827 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (applying test to township ordinances 
requiring firearm registration and fees); Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786, 
789 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (applying two-step test to state ban on public carrying of long 
guns and rifles). 
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the test leaves perhaps too much room for individual judges to place a 
finger on the sliding scale. It is ironic that Judge Sykes, who touted the 
“original public meaning” historical analysis in Heller, was so quick to 
dismiss the substantial historical evidence offered by the City as 
irrelevant and unpersuasive.168 This irony perhaps can serve as a larger 
indictment on this form of original public meaning analysis because 
judges without formal training as historians can come to widely 
different views on what conclusions to draw from history; indeed, just 
as Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens did in Heller.169 However, this is 
beyond the scope of this article. Regardless, if nothing else it was an 
inappropriate application of the historical inquiry aspect of the two-
step test for Judge Sykes to so quickly reject the historical corollaries 
between the City’s firing range regulation and past “time, place, 
manner” restrictions. Judge Sykes instead characterized the right of 
live fire arm training as one “implicating the core of the Second 
Amendment” without much historical justification of her own for that 
conclusion.170 Characterizing the right in this way allowed Judge 
Sykes to apply “something akin to strict scrutiny,” despite her own 
claim it was “not quite strict scrutiny.”171 
Regardless of the label, the regulation appeared subject to a level 
of scrutiny that few gun control measures could survive, and certainly 
higher than the intermediate scrutiny that would have been appropriate 
for such a “time, place, and manner” measure. While the regulation in 
Ezell I would have likely failed any level of scrutiny, setting the 
precedent of essentially strict scrutiny, which is binding on the lower 
courts, can have far-reaching implications for future gun control 
regulations.172 The decision also set a narrow path forward for 
                                                 
168 Ezell I, 651 F. 3d at 711 (Rovner concurring) (“Given the majority's nod to 
the relevance of historical regulation, curt dismissal of actual regulations of firearms 
discharges in urban areas is inappropriate.”). 
169 See generally, Cloud, supra note 11; D.C v. Heller, 554. U.S. 570 (2008). 
170 Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 711 (Rovner, concurring).  
171 Id.  
172 See, e.g., Tony Kole And Ghost Industries, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. Village Of 
Norridge, Defendant., No. 11 C 3871, 2017 WL 5128989, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 
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Chicago to enact replacement gun control measures, which, as we will 
see in Ezell II, it was unable to navigate. 
 
B. Variations on the Two-Step: Other Notable Post Ezell I Cases 
in the Seventh Circuit 
 
 After the Court in Ezell I adopted the two-step framework in 
2011, the test became the general standard for the Seventh Circuit in 
Second Amendment challenges going forward.173 However, the en 
banc Seventh Circuit has notably not addressed the two-step 
framework adopted in Ezell I, nor has it revisited the Second 
Amendment at all since Skoien, though it came very close in Moore v. 
Madigan.174  
The panel decision in Moore was significant in that it found two 
Illinois statutes categorically banning the carrying of guns in public 
unconstitutional.175 Rather than explicitly apply the two-step 
framework adopted in Ezell I, Judge Richard Poser in his majority 
opinion instead concluded that the text and the history of the Second 
Amendment implied that the right to “keep and bear arms” for self-
defense was not limited to the home but extended to the right to carry 
a gun for self-defense in public.176 The court held that Illinois had 
                                                                                                                   
2017) (applying the same “not quite strict scrutiny” to village ordinances restricting 
firearms dealers.). 
173 See, e.g., Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786, 789 (C.D. Ill. 2016) 
(acknowledging that “the Seventh Circuit has provided a two-step analysis in 
evaluating the constitutionality of statutes under the Second Amendment”) (citing to 
Ezell I, at 701). 
174 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). A petition for a rehearing 
en banc was denied, though four of the ten active judges reviewing the petition 
would have granted the rehearing and seemed to indicate the panel decision should 
be overturned. See generally Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(Hamilton, J., dissenting, joined by, Rovner, Williams, & Wood, JJ.). 
175 Moore, 702 F.3d at 933 (The laws at issue had exceptions for police officers 
and security personal, as well as certain exclusions for carrying a gun on one’s own 
property, but otherwise prohibited the carrying of any “ready to use” gun outside.). 
176 See id.  (“The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a 
right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as 
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failed to offer “more than merely a rational basis for believing that its 
uniquely sweeping ban [was] justified by an increase in public safety,” 
thus the laws could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.177  
Where the majority in Moore did not seem to explicitly utilize the 
two-step means-end test in striking down the state-wide gun control 
law, the majority in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois 
similarly used its own unique analysis in upholding a ban on certain 
semi-automatic assault weapons and high capacity magazines.178 In 
his opinion for the majority, Judge Easterbrook developed a three-part 
test that looked at: (1) whether the arms being banned were common at 
the time of the Second Amendments ratification; or alternately (2) 
whether the type of arm had a “reasonable relationship” to militia 
service; and finally (3) the availability of other unrestricted firearms to 
be used for self-defense.179 
Both Friedman and Moore appear to be outliers in the Seventh 
Circuit’s jurisprudence on the Second Amendment in terms of their 
analytical approach, though interestingly they reached opposite 
conclusions regarding the ultimate constitutionality of the gun 
regulations.180 Moore in particular was a major set-back for gun 
                                                                                                                   
inside. The theoretical and empirical evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is 
consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-
defense.”). 
177 Id. at 941. Illinois subsequently drafted new licensing and registration 
legislation to replace the outright ban on carrying a weapon in public. These 
requirements have subsequently been upheld as constitutional. See Berron v. Illinois 
Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 843(2017). 
178 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Friedman v. City of 
Highland Park, Ill., 136 S. Ct. 447(2015)  
179 Id. (“[I]nstead of trying to decide what ‘level’ of scrutiny applies, and how 
it works, inquiries that do not resolve any concrete dispute, we think it better to ask 
whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or 
those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a 
well regulated militia’ . . .  and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means 
of self-defense.”).  
180 See cases supra note 167; see also Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 
209-211 (criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s approach in Freidman). Freidman in 
particular is also notable because in the denial of cert, Justice Clarence Thomas filed 
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control advocates, but the court did leave the door open for a wide 
range of more nuanced legislation than the invalidated blanket bans.181 
Indeed, the new state-wide licensing requirements for carrying guns in 
public that replaced the outright ban have been upheld.182  
Apart from these notable outliers, most decisions in the Seventh 
Circuit since Ezell I have applied the two-step framework the majority 
adopted.183  
 
III. EZELL II – CHICAGO TAKES ANOTHER SHOT AT REGULATION OF 
FIRING RANGES 
 
The decision in Ezell I is critically important not just in relation to 
the application of the two-step analysis in the Seventh Circuit, but 
because its holding required that Chicago had to find a new approach 
to regulate live firing-ranges in the city. The new approach the City 
adopted became the subject of Ezell II. 
 Chicago responded to the decision in Ezell I by promulgating 
a large variety of new regulations concerning firing ranges, including 
“zoning restrictions, licensing and operating rules, construction 
standards, and environmental requirements.”184 The same plaintiffs 
from Ezell I returned to court to argue that the new regulations also 
                                                                                                                   
a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Alito arguing the court should have taken the 
case. Justice Thomas argued that the lower courts across the country had been 
incorrectly applying the decisions in Heller and McDonald, and the Supreme Court 
needed to intervene. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 136 S. Ct. 447 
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
181 See Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., 
dissenting in denial of re-hearing en banc). Judge Hamilton also encouraged district 
court judges to develop a full record so courts could appropriately way the state 
interests and the burdens in each case. Id.  
182 See Berron v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 
843, 847 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 843, 197 L. Ed. 2d 69 (2017). 
183 See, e.g., cases cited supra, note 167.  
184 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2017) (firing ranges 
operated by law enforcement and private security firms were exempt from the 
regulations). 
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violated the Second Amendment.185 After cross-motions for summary 
judgment at the district court level, the trial judge issued a ruling 
invalidating some ordinances while upholding many others, which 
both sides appealed.186 Only three of the ordinances remained at issue 
on appeal: (1) a zoning requirement that permitted ranges only in 
“manufacturing districts”; (2) a distancing requirement that barred any 
firing range within 100 feet of other ranges or within 500 feet of any 
district zoned for residential use, as well as within 500 feet from any 
“preexisting school, day-care facility, place of worship, liquor retailer, 
children's activities facility, library, museum, or hospital”; and (3) a 
regulation prohibiting anyone under the age of 18 from entering a 
shooting range.187 The district court had invalidated the manufacturing 
district zoning requirement, finding the City had failed to provide 
enough evidence to support “more than merely a rational basis” for the 
necessity of placing firing ranges exclusively in manufacturing 
districts.188 However, the court had upheld the distancing requirements 
based on Heller’s language supporting “longstanding prohibitions on 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places,” and the ban on minors 
largely because “minors are not guaranteed Second Amendment 
Rights.”189 
 Judge Sykes, again writing for the majority and joined by 
Judge Kanne, affirmed the lower court in holding the manufacturing 
district requirement unconstitutional, but reversed regarding the other 
two regulations, finding that the distancing requirements and the ban 
                                                 
185 Those plaintiffs being individual gun owners, gun rights originations, and a 
company seeking to build firing ranges. See id. 
186 Id.  
187 Id at 89. The unchallenged rulings involved ordnances setting construction 
standards, requiring range masters be present, and that all firing range employees 
had FOID cards, which were all upheld, and limits on firing range hours of operation 
which were declared unconstitutional. See generally, Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. 
Supp. 3d 871, 875 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 
2017) 
188  Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017).  
189 Id. at 889.   
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on minors in ranges also were unconstitutional.190 Judge Rovner 
concurred in the judgment regarding the manufacturing district 
requirement and the total ban on minors entering firing ranges, but she 
dissented from the decision regarding the distancing requirements.191  
 
A. The Next Round of Ordinances Meets the Next Application of 
the Two-Step Test from Ezell I 
 
Judge Sykes began her majority opinion in Ezell II by restating 
the key principals of the two-step analysis established in her opinion in 
Ezell I, where “resolving Second Amendment cases usually entails two 
inquiries. The threshold question is whether the regulated activity falls 
within the scope of the Second Amendment . . . then there must be a 
second inquiry into the strength of the government’s justification for 
restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”192 
Again, the first step is a “textual and historical” inquiry to determine 
whether the regulated conduct falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment, and the second step is a sliding scale “means-end” test 
where the regulation is examined under a “heightened standard of 
scrutiny,” the precise level of which depends on “how close the law 
comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of 
the law’s burden on the right.”193 Judge Sykes further noted that, by 
the time of Ezell II, the majority of other circuits had now adopted the 
same or similar two-step framework.194 
                                                 
190 Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 890. 
191 See generally, id. at 898-907 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
192 Id. at 892 (majority opinion).  
193 Id.  
194 See id. at 893; see generally, Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 775 
F.3d 308, 326 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 
746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014); Nat'l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); Heller 
v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 
34
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/3




 In terms of the threshold scope question, the same holding 
and analysis from Ezell I was applied in the current case: that the 
Second Amendment “individual right of armed defense . . . includes a 
corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in firearm use 
through target practice at a range.”195 Interestingly, when describing 
how the court had applied step two of the framework in Ezell I, Judge 
Sykes stated that the court “applied a strong form of intermediate 
scrutiny.”196 What was once “not quite strict scrutiny” before was now 
a “strong form of intermediate scrutiny.”197 Whatever the level of 
scrutiny, the majority did not elaborate further on what specific form 
of scrutiny it was applying to the regulations at issue in Ezell II.198 
Rather, Judge Sykes focused on the language from the sliding-scale 
test in Ezell I, which requires that the City demonstrate “a close fit 
between the range ban and the actual public interests it serves, and 
also that the public's interests are strong enough to justify so 
substantial an encumbrance on individual Second Amendment 
rights.”199 In order to establish this “close fit” between the challenged 
regulations and the “actual public benefits they serve,” the majority 
agreed with the lower court in finding that the City needed to do so 
with “actual evidence, not just assertions.”200 
 Judge Sykes proceeded to examine this evidence and analyze 
whether there was such a close fit.201 In doing so, Judge Sykes argued 
that the critical failure of the lower court’s approach was analyzing the 
zoning and distancing requirements separately, stating instead that 
they “stand or fall together,” and that they are “a single regulatory 
                                                                                                                   
800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
195 Id. at 892-93 (restating that “[r]ange training is not categorically outside the 
Second Amendment. To the contrary, it lies close to the core of the individual right 
of armed defense.”). 
196 Id. at 893.  
197 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).  
198 Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 893. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 894.  
201 Id. 
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package for purposes of Second Amendment Scrutiny.202 Furthermore, 
Judge Sykes disagreed with the lower courts understanding of the 
Heller language on prohibitions of carrying firearms in “sensitive 
places.”203 While declining to resolve the question of the presumptive 
validity of those categories of “longstanding prohibitions,” Judge 
Sykes indicated that the distancing requirement did not fall into any of 
those categories, because it dealt with firing ranges and not the 
carrying of firearms themselves.204 In addition, Judge Sykes argued 
that the distancing requirement from residential districts implied that 
the City was suggesting that firearms “are categorically incompatible 
with residential areas,” which she stated was “flatty inconsistent with 
Heller, which was explicit that firearm possession in the home for self-
defense is the core of the Second Amendment.”205  
 Judge Sykes’s opinion next examined the city’s evidence that 
the zoning and distance requirements together supported their offered 
public safety interests, specifically that “firing ranges attract gun 
thieves, cause airborne lead contamination, and carry a risk of fire.”206 
On this score, the City was severely lacking in evidence, having 
presented no empirical data that the mere presence of a firing range 
would increase the risk of theft or crime, or that distancing firing 
ranges from schools and residences had a connection to reducing these 
risks.207 The City’s own expert witnesses also had testified to the lack 
of empirical support for the connection between the regulations and 
                                                 
202 Id. Judge Sykes elaborated by arguing that: “The two zoning requirements 
work in tandem to limit where shooting ranges may locate. The impact of the 
distancing rule cannot be measured “standing alone,” as the district judge thought; to 
meaningfully evaluate the effect of the buffer-zone requirement, we need to know 
which zoning districts are open to firing ranges.” Id. 
203 See Id. at 894-95. 
204 Id. 
205Id. 
206Id. at 895. 
207 Id. The City did cite to a National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health report on the dangers of improperly ventilated shooting ranges to the 
environment, but the same report included guidelines on techniques for how to avoid 
those consequences. Id. 
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the risks to public safety and health from fire or environmental 
hazards.208 Furthermore, insofar as there was evidence of risks, Judge 
Sykes noted that the City had promulgated a host of other regulations 
on the proper construction and operation of firing ranges which would 
alleviate many of the safety concerns without necessitating zoning or 
distance requirements.209 These construction requirements had been 
upheld by the District Court and were not on appeal.210 
While Judge Sykes did not dismiss the general concerns of the 
city to public health and safety, in the end she stated that “there must 
be evidence” to support the City’s rational.211 The lack of such 
evidence meant that the city had failed to establish a “close fit” 
between the regulations and their justification, and they were 
unconstitutional under the “strong form of intermediate scrutiny” or 
the “not quite strict scrutiny” that the court was applying.212 
In terms of the ban on minors, Judge Sykes noted that there was 
“zero historical evidence that firearm training” for minors under 18 
was “categorically unprotected,” and neither the City nor the Court 
could find any evidence to the contrary.213 Furthermore, the cases 
relied upon by the City all dealt with prohibitions on minors 
“possessing, purchasing, or carrying firearms,214 and the only Seventh 
Circuit case related to minors dealt with a parental signature 
                                                 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id.  
211 Id.  
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 896. 
214 See, e.g., NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding a state 
law banning 18- to 20-year-olds from carrying handguns in public); NRA v BATFE, 
700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding a federal law prohibiting 18- to 21-year-
olds from purchasing a handgun);  United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 
2009) (upholding a federal law prohibiting juvenile handgun possession);  People v. 
Mosley, 33 N.E.3d 137 (2015) (upholding a state law banning 18- to 20-year-olds 
from carrying handguns outside the home).  
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requirement for so called “FOID” cards.215 Because the City could not 
prove minors were categorically excluded, the court preceded to the 
second step. Again, the City had little evidence other than generalized 
assertions about the safety of children, with one of their own witnesses 
admitting that the best place for minors to train with firearms would in 
fact be a controlled firing range.216 The City offered many other 
general justifications based on child development and health, but with 
no concrete evidence the categorical ban could not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.217 
 
B. Judge Rovner: Separating and Weighing the Heavy Public 
Interests 
 
Judge Rovner, again finding herself writing separately, restated 
the sliding-scale test from Ezell I and her own contradictory assertion 
from that case that the right to participate in range training was not an 
“important corollary” to the core right of self defense but was, at most  
ancillary to the core right.218 Judge Rovner argued that for the 
purposes of the current dispute “we can ignore whether there is a 
difference in these two descriptions and assume that the right is an 
important one: although not part and parcel of the core right, close to 
but subordinate to it. How far subordinate is yet unknown.”219 What 
Judge Rovner and the majority did agree on was that this case was 
different, and that what they were reviewing was not an outright ban 
but a “regulation of where when and how firing ranges may 
operate.”220 Interestingly, Judge Rovner did not seek to characterize 
                                                 
215 See Horsley v Trame, 808 F.3d. 1126, 1127 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh 
Circuit panel in Horsley did not answer the question of whether minors are 
categorically excluded from the Second Amendment, as the district court in Ezell II 
believed they were, but rather the Horsley court had held the FOID card requirement 
satisfied intermediate scrutiny whatever the scope of minor’s rights. Id. 
216 Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 897. 
217 See id. at 898. 
218 Id. at 899 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
219 Id. 
220 Id.  
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these firing-range regulations as “time, place and manner” restrictions 
as she had in Ezell I, but instead stated in a footnote that the term “is 
heavily loaded with attachments to a particular level of scrutiny under 
First Amendment jurisprudence—a quagmire better to avoid in this 
case.”221  
Now eschewing labels of the proper level of scrutiny herself, 
Judge Rovner instead focused on the manner of the majority’s 
application of the two-part test, and specifically the assertion, “without 
any rationale,” that the manufacturing district and distance 
requirements “stand or fall together.”222 Judge Rovner agreed with the 
majority on the manufacturing district requirement being 
unconstitutional on the lack of evidentiary support but was highly 
critical of Judge Sykes’ claim that the zoning requirement necessarily 
fell with it.223 Judge Rovner agreed that there was a lack of any 
“robust, reliable evidence” tying the manufacturing district 
requirement to the actual public safety justifications offered by the 
City, and that the “generalized propositions that firing ranges pose a 
danger—in terms of both crime and environmental impact—did not 
justify restricting them to manufacturing districts only as opposed to 
other industrial zones.”224  
However, Judge Rovner noted that unlike the manufacturing 
regulation, which made a categorical determination on where a 
particular land used belongs, the distancing regulation was a “much 
more focused determination of how close a particular use (which may 
have unique impacts) may be to other uses.”225 In Judge Rovner’s 
view, under a sliding scale levels of scrutiny test, the two regulations 
had to be addressed separately because they had separate government 
rationales and separate effects on the public interest of Chicago 
citizens.226 
                                                 
221 Id. n. 2. 
222 Id. at 900. 
223 See id. at 899-900.  
224 Id at 901. 
225 Id. at 900. 
226 Id.  
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 Judge Rovner proceeded to evaluate these interests and 
regulations separately, and even though she came to the same 
conclusion on the manufacturing district requirement, she reached the 
opposite on the distance requirements.227 For the distance requirement, 
Judge Rovner first noted that, on its own, it did not impact as much of 
the available land in the city as it did when taken together with the 
zoning requirement, which only made about 10.6% percent of the land 
in the city available for firing ranges.228 On its own, the distancing 
requirement did not reduce the available land as much; therefore, it 
“imposed a significantly lighter burden on the placement of firing 
ranges,” and the sliding-scale test from Ezell I dictated that “a lighter 
burden requires a lesser justification.”229 Where the zoning 
requirement was a blanket prohibition for all firing ranges in every 
area except manufacturing districts, the distancing regulation was a 
“precise and targeted approach” to protect areas that the city “routinely 
singles out for protection—places where children and the sick are 
gathered, for example.”230 Thus, the difference between the two was 
the “difference between a carpet bomb and a surgical strike,” and the 
evaluation of the public benefit was vastly different.231  
Moreover, Judge Rovner disagreed with the majority regarding 
the “sensitive places” language from Heller regarding longstanding 
historical prohibitions on “carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings.”232 Judge Rovner declined to 
opine whether this language indicated a categorical exception for such 
regulations but argued that it was enough to support the conclusion 
that a “sufficiently strong public interest” justified regulations 
distancing these “sensitive places” from firing ranges.233 
                                                 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 902. 
229 Id.  
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. (emphasis in original). 
233 Id. 
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Judge Rovner also criticized the majority’s argument that the 
distancing requirement, specifically regarding the distance from 
residential areas, was incompatible with Heller’s main premise of 
keeping a gun in the home for self-defense. As Judge Rovner noted: 
 
[k]eeping or even carrying a firearm for self-defense poses a 
substantially different risk than does creating a public 
accommodation where large numbers of people will gather 
with firearms loaded with lead-contaminated, explosive-filled 
ammunition and fire them. Firing a gun poses significantly 
greater risks than the mere keeping or carrying of a gun, in 
terms of potential accidents, attractiveness to criminals, and 
environmental lead exposure.234 
 
In short, the uniquely dangerous nature of guns, and firing ranges with 
large quantities of them being regularly discharged, as well as the 
interests in preventing theft in crime, all “cause a heavy weight on the 
public interest side of the scale”235  
In terms of evidence, Judge Rovner noted that in the First 
Amendment context the Supreme Court had rejected any requirement 
for empirical data showing an ordinance will successfully lower 
crime.236 While the City could not tie any evidence to the 
manufacturing district requirement, they did have evidentiary support 
for their argument that locating firing ranges near vulnerable 
populations and residences carried risks that could be alleviated 
through distancing requirements.237Judge Rovner noted this evidence 
in the numerous other examples in the City code of setting distancing 
requirements which created a “buffer zone” between dangerous or 
adult-themed businesses and sensitive areas such as schools or 
                                                 
234 Id. at 903. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 903-904.  
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hospitals.238 This support, along with the heavy public interest 
rational, was enough to allow the distancing regulations to survive 
constitutional scrutiny in Judge Rovner’s view.239 
Finally, in terms of the ban on minors, Judge Rovner agreed that 
the City had failed to show any evidence supporting the categorical 
exclusion of minors from firing ranges under the Second 
Amendment.240 However, Judge Rovner noted that in the First 
Amendment context, the rights of minors are limited to different 
degrees in different contexts,241 and that even beyond that “it goes 
without saying that the government may restrict the rights of minors 
for the purposes of protecting their health and safety.”242 Pointing to 
examples of the “long history of protecting minors, even where 
fundamental rights are in play,” Judge Rovner felt it important to note 
that where an outright ban on entering firing ranges was too far, a 
variety of “stringent regulations for minors in firing ranges would 
withstand much scrutiny when supported by appropriate evidence.”243 
 
C. The State of the Two-Step Test and Gun Control Legislation 
in the Seventh Circuit after Ezell II 
 
The majority opinion in Ezell II is interesting not only because it 
further cemented the use of the two-step sliding-scale analysis 
established in Ezell I, but also because Judge Sykes avoided stating 
with clarity what level of scrutiny on that scale was being applied. 
                                                 
238 See id. (citing to municipal distancing restrictions for “machine shops,” 
“nitrocellulose” manufacturing facilities, slaughter houses, and the operation of 
unmanned aircraft). 
239 Id. at 904. 
240 Id. 
240 Id. (“To the extent that McDonald and its progeny allow for firearm 
ownership within the City of Chicago, the practical argument that parents who have 
guns within the City limits might also wish to teach gun safety to their children is not 
without merit.”). 
241 Id at 904-905. 
242 Id. at 905. 
243 Id. 
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After characterizing the level of scrutiny from Ezell I as “a strong form 
of intermediate scrutiny,” and requiring a “close fit,” the opinion 
focuses largely on the lack of evidence proffered by the city and a 
failure to show more than mere general and speculative health and 
safety concerns.244 It is true that the hard evidence was particularly 
lacking for the manufacturing district requirement and the requirement 
would likely have failed under any standard of review.245 Indeed, that 
the manufacturing ban would have failed regardless of the standard of 
scrutiny perhaps answers the question of why Judge Sykes concluded 
that the distancing requirement—which seemed on more solid footing 
on its own—necessarily had to fall with it.246 As Judge Rovner noted, 
the correct application of the sliding scale test would have seen the 
two restrictions analyzed separately and on its own the distancing 
requirement should have survived.247 
 Regardless of the decision to examine both regulations 
together, it is important to highlight the standard of review the court 
used in Ezell II because of its implications on future decisions. Based 
on the discussion of Ezell I, we can assume that what Judge Sykes was 
applying was the same “not quite strict scrutiny” or “strong form of 
intermediate scrutiny” she had previously described and applied to 
regulations affecting firearm training.248 Similarly for Judge Rovner, 
though she also avoided explicit description of any standard of 
scrutiny, we can likely assume that she was applying a form of 
                                                 
244 See id at 896 (majority opinion). 
245 See id. at 901-902 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(observing that the City’s limited evidence that the manufacturing requirement 
prevented lead contamination at most established a rational basis for the law, which 
was not enough to survive review). 
246 Id. at 894 (majority opinion).  
247 Id. at 900 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
248 See id. at 892-93 (majority opinion) (“We take as settled what was 
established in Ezell I . . . This holding and these observations control here.). 
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intermediate scrutiny appropriate for “time, place, manner” gun use 
restrictions, based on her allusions to her own opinion in Ezell I.249  
 While in Ezell I the distinction may not have been important 
because the complete ban on firing ranges would have failed under 
either level,250 we can see in Ezell II why it is vitally important what 
standard of scrutiny on the sliding scale the courts apply. Applying 
intermediate scrutiny for time, place, and manner style gun restrictions 
as Judge Rovner has advocated would have almost certainly led the 
distancing requirement  to survive review.251 But, by characterizing the 
right in a manner that requires what is essentially strict scrutiny 
review, Judge Sykes has all but ensured that regulations involving 
firing ranges, or implicating this right to live fire arm training, must 
necessarily fail. While the City failed to present more than speculative 
evidence for the manufacturing zoning requirement, and their evidence 
for the distancing requirements was far from robust,252 one is left to 
wonder how much evidence they would have to muster to meet a 
standard of review akin to strict scrutiny. 
The result in Ezell II is also ironic given Judge Sykes’ own words 
in Ezell I encouraging Chicago to replace its total ban on ranges with 
zoning regulations.253 Judge Sykes incorrectly discounted the Supreme 
Court’s language from Heller regarding the validity of longstanding 
                                                 
249 See id. at 899 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(describing her disagreement with the majority in Ezell I has how to characterize the 
right to range training).  
250 See Ezell I, 651 F. 3d 684, 712 (Rovner, J. concurring). 
251 See Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 904 (Rovner, J. concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“given the lighter burden imposed by the distancing regulations, the strong 
public interest in protecting residential areas and sensitive areas from the risks 
associated with firing ranges, these regulations pass constitutional muster”); see also 
Ezell I, 651 F. 3d at 712 (Rovner, J. concurring) (“The City has a right to impose 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the operation of live ranges in the 
interest of public safety and other legitimate governmental concerns.”). 
252 See Ezell II, 846 F. 3d at 901-02 (Rovner, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
253 Ezell I, 651 F. 3d at 709 (“on this record [the City’s] concerns are entirely 
speculative and, in any event, can be addressed through sensible zoning and other 
appropriately tailored regulations.” 
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prohibitions on carrying guns in “sensitive places” like schools.254 
Judge Sykes conclusion that the distancing requirements were not a 
“limitation on where firearms may be carried” and thus did not fall 
under the “sensitive places” language in Heller was erroneous.255 
Quite the opposite, firing ranges are places with high concentrations of 
firearms being carried and discharged in one location.256 It seems 
obvious that restricting how close these firing ranges can be located to 
schools and residences falls squarely within the coverage of the 
Supreme Court’s language on presumptively valid longstanding 
prohibitions on the carrying of guns in “sensitive places.”257 If nothing 
else, they would seem to be the kind of “sensible zoning” restrictions 
that Judge Sykes herself encouraged the City to pursue.258 Indeed, as 
Judge Rovner noted in her dissent, the City has commonly enacted 
similar distancing restrictions on how close dangerous businesses can 
be located to places that serve vulnerable populations at schools or 
hospitals.259 
                                                 
254 See Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 894-95.  
255 See id at 902 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
256 See id. at 903 (“owning, keeping or even carrying a firearm for self-defense 
poses a substantially different risk than does creating a public accommodation where 
large numbers of people will gather with firearms loaded with lead-contaminated, 
explosive-filled ammunition and fire them.”). 
257 See id. 
258 See Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 709.  
259 See Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 903 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). A related argument, which Judge Rovner does not directly address, would 
be to draw an analogy between analyzing zoning and distancing requirements under 
the Second Amendment to how courts have approached zoning restrictions on adult 
book stores and theaters under the First Amendment. See Second Amendment Arms 
v. City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The district court in 
Second Amendment Arms considered this very possibility in a case involving similar 
Chicago zoning ordinances which limited the location of firearms retailers. Id. The 
court rejected the use of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment burden shifting 
framework for zoning restrictions of adult-use businesses. Id. The court said the 
framework was a poor fit in the Second Amendment context because regulations on 
the commercial sale of fire-arms fell into Heller’s language regarding presumptively 
valid longstanding regulations. See id. Interesting then, and contrary to the Ezell II 
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For now, Ezell II is binding precedent in the Circuit, and lower 
courts that encounter regulations that burden, or could be seen as 
burdening, this “right to maintain proficiency in firearm use,” will 
presumably be bound to apply this “strong form of intermediate 
scrutiny.”260 Of course, the flexibility inherent in the sliding-scale 
means-end test should still allow other panels or district courts in the 
Seventh Circuit to apply the more deferential form of intermediate 
scrutiny for other gun regulations that only implicate the “time, place, 
and manner” of firearm use. 
 The full effects of this precedent remain to be seen, but what 
can be said is Ezell II gives support to courts to apply a heightened 
standard of review akin to strict scrutiny to strike down gun control 
regulations. The use of this stringent standard of review for regulations 
that in reality only regulate the time, place, and manner of firearm use 
is wholly inappropriate and ultimately dangerous given the unique 




After initially asking for a delay in the injunctions ordered by the 
Seventh Circuit, the City withdrew its motion.261 Thus, after seven 
years the Ezell litigation appears to have come to a close. While it 
remains to be see how the City will respond to the ordinances being 
struck down, we can assume for the time being that construction of 
firing ranges can soon begin without concern for their distance from 
schools, residential areas, or high crime areas where their concentrated 
stock of guns could be susceptible to theft. 
This result has very real effects for the people of Chicago, whom 
are already struggling with an unprecedented level of gun violence 
causing injury and death in their city. Obviously, preventing the 
construction of firing ranges in practical terms does nothing to 
                                                                                                                   
court, the district court in Second Amendment Arms upheld the zoning restrictions 
based on the strong presumption of their validity under the language in Heller. Id.  
260 Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 893 (majority opinion).  
261 See docket report for, Ezell et al., v. City of Chicago, 1:10CV05135. 
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affirmatively lower the current historical levels of gun violence. 
However, given the uniquely dangerous nature of fire arms and the 
extraordinary risk they pose to public safety, it is not hard to 
understand the City’s desire to enact whatever control measures they 
can. Indeed, it appears a fairly legitimate concern that allowing firing 
ranges, with their high concentrations of firearms packed in one 
location, might make the task of limiting the number of guns on the 
street more difficult.  
That task has been made monumentally more difficult in the 
current Second Amendment constitutional regime. After McDonald 
foreclosed the City’s complete bans on handgun ownership, the realm 
of permissible regulation has only been further narrowed in the years 
since. Ezell I and II, though focused on the seemingly confined issue 
of firing range training, have great implications for future attempts at 
regulation. Any future gun control measures that implicate this newly 
recognized right to live firearm training seem destined to fall under the 
strict scrutiny review used by the court.  
The time will soon come for the en banc Seventh Circuit to clarify 
the position for the lower courts that encounter Second Amendment 
challenges. If presented with the opportunity, the en banc court should 
use Judge Rovner’s opinions in both Ezell I & II as examples of how 
to correctly apply the the two-step test for the Second Amendment. 
Local governments like Chicago do have their own responsibility in 
future lawsuits to present better and more concrete empirical evidence 
to support the public health justifications for their proposed gun 
control measures. In turn, these local governments need courts to 
apply the appropriate standard of review. That standard needs to be 
one where gun control regulations that only affect the “time, place and 
manner” of firearm use, or other ancillary conduct unconnected with 
self-defense in the home, are only subject to intermediate scrutiny.  
In the meantime, Chicago has been left, as Judge Rovner 
sympathized, navigating a narrow straight between a dreaded “Scylla 
and Charybdis.” On one hand, the City faces a gun violence epidemic 
garnering national attention and threating the health and safety of its 
citizens on a daily basis. On the other, there is an expanding realm of 
protected Second Amendment activities historically unconnected to 
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the past and far beyond the original right to self-defense in the home 
recognized in Heller. The City will have to continue to experiment 
with gun control regulations to find those measures that can tread this 
narrow constitutional path forward. 
 Of course, in the absence of similar regulations in neighboring 
jurisdictions, the actual impact of any local regulations on gun 
violence is very much an open question. In the end, any truly effective 
measure to combat the City’s gun violence problem will likely require 
a more national scale.  
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